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[Crim. No. 8528. In Bank. May 25, 1965.] 
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JAMES ED-
WARDS WASHINGTON, Defendant and Appellant. 
[1] Homicide-First Degree Murder-Intent.-Except when the 
common-Iaw-felony-murder doctrine applies, an essential ele-
ment of murder is an intent to kill or an intent, with conscious 
disregard for life, to commit acts likely to kill. 
[2] Id.-First Degree Murder-Killing in Perpetration of Felony. 
-The felony-murder doctrine ascribes malice aforethought to 
the felon who kills in the perpetration of an inherently dan-
gerous felony. 
[3] Id.-First Degree Murder-Killing in Perpetration of Robbery. 
-When a killing is not committed by a robber or by his ac-
complice, but by his victim, malice aforethought is not attribu-
table to the robber, for the killing is not committed by him in 
the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate robbery. 
[4] Id.-First Degree Murder-Killing in Perpetration of Felony. 
-Pen. Code, § 189, making a killing in the perpetration of 
certain felonies first degree murder, requires that a felon or his 
accomplice commit the killing, for if he does not, the killing is 
not committed to perpetrate the felony; to include within 
§ 189 a killing committed by a victim to thwart a robbery would 
expand the meaning of the words "murder ... which is com-
mitted in the perpetration . . . [of] robbery • • ." beyond 
common understanding. 
[6] Id.-First Degree Murder-Killing in Perpetration of Felony. 
-The purpose of the felony-murder rule is to deter felons 
from killing negligently or accidentally by holding them strictly 
responsible for killings they commit; this purpose is not served 
by punishing them for killings committed by their victims. 
[6] Id.-First Degree Murder-Killing in Perpetration of Robbery. 
-Neither the common-law rationale of the felony-murder rule 
[1] See Ca.l . .Tur.2d, Homicide, §§ 86, 87; Am . .Tur., Homicide (1st 
cd § 34). 
[3] Homicide in commission of felony where the killing was the 
act of one not a participant in the felony, note, 12 A.L.R.2d 210. 
See also Ca1..Tur.2d, Homicide, § 77; Am . .Tur., Homicide (1st ed 
§ 39). 
MeK. Dig. References: [1] Homicide, § 15(1); [2-6, 8, 12] 
Homicide, § 15 (6); [7, 11] Homicide, § 4; [9] Homicide, § 11; 
[10] Homicide, § 6; [13] Robbery, § 32; [14] Criminal Law, § 840. 
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nor the Penal Code supports the eontention that a purpose of 
the rule is to prevent the commission of robberies. 
[7] Id.-Pa.rticipation in 01fense Resulting in Homicide.-A de-
fendant need not be the killer to be guilty of murder; he may 
be vicariously responsible under rules defining principals and 
criminal conspiracies. 
[8] Id.-First Degree Murder-Killing in Perpetration of Robbery. 
-All persons aiding and abetting the commission of n robbery 
are guilty of first degree murder when one of them kills while 
acting in furtherance of the common design. 
[9] Id.-Murder.-When defendant intends to kill or intentionally 
commits, with a conscious disregard for life, acts that are 
likely to kill, he is guilty of murder though he uses another 
person to accomplish his objective. 
[10] Id.-Participation in 01fense Resulting in Homicide-Liabil-
ity for Death of Coconspirator.-Defendants who initiate gun 
battles may be found guilty of murder if their victims resist 
and kill, and it is unnecessary to imply malice by invoking 
. the felony-murder doctrine. 
[11] Id.-Participation in 01fense Resulting in Homicide.-To in-
voke the felony-murder doctrine to imply malice when de-
fendants initiate a gun battle and the victim resists and kills 
another is unnecessary and overlooks the principles of criminal 
liability governing one person's responsibility for a killing 
committed by another. 
[12] Id.-First Degree Murder-Killing in Perpetration of Felony. 
-The felony-murder rule (Pen. Code, § 189) should not be 
extended beyond its rational function, and for defendant to 
be guilty of murder under that rule, the killing must be com-
mitted by defendant or his accomplice acting in furtherance 
of their common design. (Disapproving inconsistent language 
in People v. Harrison, 176 Cal.App.2d 330 [1 Cal.Rptr. 414].) 
[18] Robbery-Evidence-Participation in 01fense.-The evidence 
sufficed to support defendant's conviction of robbery where, 
though his testimony that he was drunk and asleep in the ear 
when the robbery took place was corroborated, the victim 
identified defendant as a participant in the robbery. 
[14] Oriminal Law-Instructions-Oredibility of Prosecuting Wit-
ness.-In a prosecution for robbery and murder, the trial court 
was not required, on its own motion, to instruct the jury to 
view the testimony of the alleged robbery victim with caution, 
on the ground that he was relieved of responsibility for the 
shooting of defendant's accomplice by implicating defendant 
in an attempted robbery, where defendant had a fair oppor-
tunity to controvert the witness' testimony and the court prop-
erly instructed the jurors that they were the exclusive judges 
of the credibility of witnesses and informed them that they 
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might consider such matters as the relation of the witnesses 
to the case and their interest therein. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County and from an order denying a new trial. John 
G. Barnes, Judge. Judgment affirmed in part and reversed 
in part; appeal from order dismissed. 
Prosecution for robbery and murder. Judgment affirmed as 
to conviction of first degree robbery and reversed as to con-
viction of first degree murder. 
Erling J. Hovden, Public Defender, Paul G. Breckenridge, 
Jr., and James L. McCormick, Deputy Public Defenders, for 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Stanley Mosk and Thomas C. Lynch, Attorneys General, 
William E. James, Assistant Attorney General, and Gordon 
Ringer, Deputy Attorney General, for) Plaintiff and Re-
spondent. 
TRAYNOR, C. J.-Defendant appeals from a judgment of 
conviction entered upon jury verdicts finding him guilty of 
first degree robbery (Pen. Code, §§ 211, 211a) and first degree 
murder and :fixing the murder penalty at life imprisonment. 
(Pen. Code, §§ 187, 189, 190, 190.1.) 1 . He was convicted of 
murd.er for participating in a robbery in which his accom-
plice was killed by the victim of the robbery. 
Shortly before 10 p.m., October 2, 1962, Johnnie Carpenter 
prepared to close his gasoline station. He was in his office 
computing the receipts and disbursements of the day while 
an attendant in an adjacent storage room deposited money 
in a vault. Upon hearing someone yell" robbery," Carpenter 
opened his desk and took out a revolver. A few moments later, 
James Ball entered the office and pointed a revolver directly 
at Carpenter, who fired immediately, mortally wounding Ball. 
Carpenter then hurried to the door and saw an unarmed 
man he later identified as defendant running from the vault 
with a moneybag in his right hand. He shouted "Stop." 
When his warning was not heeded, he fired and hit defend-
ant who fell wounded in front of the station. 
The Attorney General, relying on People v. Harrison, 176 
1 Defendant'8 appeal from the nonappealable order denying a new 
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Cal.App.2d 330 [1 Cal.Rptr. 414], contends that defendant 
was properly convicted of first degree murder. In that case 
defendants initiated a gun battle with an employee in an 
attempt to rob a cleaning business. In the crossfire, the 
employee accidentally killed the owner of the business. The 
court affirmed the judgment convicting defendants of first 
degree murder, invoking Commonwealth v. Almeida, 362 Pa. 
596 [68 A.2d 595, 12 A.L.R.2d 183], and People v. Podolski, 
332 Mich. 508 [52 N.W.2d 201], which held that robbers who 
provoked gunfire were guilty of first degree murder even 
though the lethal bullet was fired by a policeman. 
Defendant would distinguish the Harrison, Almeida, and 
Podolski cases on the ground that in each instance the person 
killed was an innocent victim, not one of the felons. He 
suggests that we limit the rule of the Harrison case just as 
the Supreme Courts of Pennsylvania and Michigan have lim-
ited the Almeida and Podolski cases by holding that sur-
viving felons are not guilty of murder when their accomplices 
are killed by persons resisting the felony. (Commonwealth 
v. Redline, 391 Pa. 486 [137 A.2d 472]; People v. Austin, 
370 Mich. 12 [120 N.W.2d 766]; see also People v. Wood~ 
8 N.Y.2d 48 [201 N.Y.S.2d 328, 167 N.E.2d 736].) A dis-
tinction based on the person killed, however, would make 
the defendant's criminal liability turn upon the marksman-
ship of victims and policemen. A rule of law cannot reason-
ably be based on such a fortuitous circumstance. The basic 
issue therefore is whether a robber can be convicted of murder 
for the killing of any person by another who is resisting the 
robbery. 
"Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being, with 
malice aforethought." (Pen. Code, § 187.) [1] Except 
when the common-Iaw-felony-murder doctrine is applicable, 
an essential element of murder is an intent to kill or an 
intent with conscious disregard for life to commit acts likely 
to kill. (See People v. Thomas, 41 Cal.2d 470, 475 [261 P.2d 
1] [concurring opinion].) [2] The felony-murder doc-
trine ascribes malice aforethought to the felon who kills in 
the perpetration of an inherently dangerous felony. (People 
v. Ford, 60 Cal.2d 772, 795 [36 Cal.Rptr. 620, 388 P.2d 892] ; 
People v. Coefield, 37 Ca1.2d 865, 868 [236 P.2d 570].) That 
doctrine is incorporated in section 189 of the Penal Code, 
which provides in part: "All murder ... committed in the 
perpetration or attempt to perpetrate ... robbery ... is mur-
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speaks only of degrees of "murder," inadvertent or accidental 
killings are first degree murders when committed by felons 
in the perpetration of robbery. (People v. Coefield, supra, 
37 Cal.2d 865, 868; People v. Boss, 210 Cal. 245, 249 [290 
P. 881].) 
[3] When a killing is not committed by a robber or by 
his accomplice but by his victim, malice aforethought is not 
attributable to the robber, for the killing is not committed 
by him in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate robbery. 
It is not enough that the killing was a risk reasonably to 
be foreseen and that the robbery might therefore be regarded 
as a proximate cause of the killing. [4] Section 189 re-
quires that the felon or his accomplice commit the killing, 
for if he does not, the killing is not committed to perpetrate 
the felony. Indeed, in the present case the killing was com-
mitted to thwart a felony. To include such killings within 
section 189 would expand the meaning of the words "murder 
... which is committed in the perpetration ... [of] robbery ... " 
beyond common understanding. 
[6] The purpose of the felony-murder rule is to deter 
. felons from killing negligently or accidentally by holding 
them strictly responsible for killings they commit. (See 
Holmes, The Common Law, pp. 58-59; Model Penal Code 
(Tent. Draft No.9, May 8, 1959) § 201.2, comment 4 at pp. 
37 -38; Report of the Royal Commission on Capital Punish-
ment, Cmd. No. 8932, at pp. 35-36 (1949-1953).) This purpose 
is not served by punishing them for killings committed by 
their victims. 
[6] It is contended, however, that another purpose of the 
felony-murder rule is to prevent the commission of robberies. 
Neither the common-law rationale of the rule nor the Penal 
Code supports this contention. In every robbery there is a 
possibility that the victim will resist and kill. The robber 
has little control over such a killing once the robbery is 
undertaken as this case demonstrates. To impose an addi-
tional penalty for the killing would discriminate between 
robbers, not on the basis of any difference in their own con-
duct, but solely on the basis of the response by others that 
the robber's conduct happened to induce. An additional 
penalty for a homicide committed by the victim would deter 
robbery haphazardly at best. To "prevent stealing, [the 
law] would do better to hang one thief in every thousand by 
lot." (Holmes, The Common Law, p. 58.) 
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to be guilty of murder. He may be vicariously responsible 
under the rules defining principals and criminal conspiracies. 
[8] All persons aiding and abetting the commission of a 
robbery are guilty of first degree murder when one of them 
kills while acting in furtherance of the common design. 
(People v. Boss, 210 Cal. 245, 249 [290 P. 881] ; People v. 
Kauffman, 152 Cal. 331, 334 [92 P. 861].) [9] Moreover, 
when the defendant intends to kill or intentionally commits 
acts that are likely to kill with a conscious disregard for life, 
he is guilty of murder even though he uses another person 
to accomplish his objective. (Johnson v. State, 142 Ala. 70 
[38 So. 182, 2 L.R.A. N.S. 897]; see also Wilson v. State, 
188 Ark. 846 [68 S.W.2d 100] ; Taylor v. State, 41 Tex. Crim. 
Rep. 564 [55 S.W. 961].) 
[10] Defendants who initiate gun battles may also be 
found guilty of murder if their victims resist and kill. Under 
such circumstances, ' , the defendant for a base, antisocial 
motive and with wanton disregard for human life, does 
an act that involves a high degree of probability that it will 
result in death" (People v. Thomas, 41 Cal.2d 470, 480 [261 
P.2d 1] [concurring opinion), and it is unnecessary to 
imply malice by invoking the felony-murder doctrine.2 
[11] To invoke the felony-murder doctrine to imply malice 
in such a case is unnecessary and overlooks the principles of 
criminal liability that should govern the responsibility of 
one person for a killing committed by another. (See Hart 
and Honore, Causation in the Law, pp. 296-299; Hall, Crim-
inal Law, 2d ed., pp. 270-281; Morris, The Felon's Responsi-
bility for the Lethal Acts of Others, 105 U.Pa.L.Rev. 50; Brett, 
An Inquiry Into Criminal Guilt, pp. 123-124.) 
To invoke the felony-murder doctrine when the killing is 
not committed by the defendant or by his accomplice could 
lead to absurd results. Thus, two men rob a grocery store 
and :flee in opposite directions. The owner of the store follows 
one of the robbers and kills him. Neither robber may have 
fired a shot. Neither robber may have been armed with a 
deadly weapon. If the felony-murder doctrine applied, how-
20ne scholar has commented that "People v. Harrison, 176 Cal.App.2d 
330, 1 Cal.Rptr. 414 (1959). is probably not, strictly speaking, a felony-
murder ease at all, but rather a case taking a very relaxed view of the 
necessary causal connection between the defendant's act and the victim's 
death, an approach which is possible quite independent of the felony-
murder rule." (Packer, The Case for ReviBion of the Penal Code, 13 
S~.L.Rev. 252, 259, fn. 39.) 
) 
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ever, the surviving robber could be convicted of first degree 
murder (see Commonwealth v. Thomas, 382 Pa. 639 [117 
A.2d 204], overruled by Commonwealth v. Redline, 391 Pa. 
486 [137 A.2d 472]), even though he was captured by a 
policeman and placed under arrest at the time his accomplice 
was killed. (Commonwealth v. Doris, 287 Pa. 547 [135 A. 313] ; 
see People v. Corkery, 134 Cal.App. 294 [25 P.2d 257].) 
The felony-murder rule has been criticized on the grounds 
that in almost all cases in which it is applied it is unnecessary 
and that it erodes the relation between criminal liability and 
moral culpability. (See e.g., Model Penal Code (Tent. Draft 
No.9, May 8, 1959) § 201.2, comment 4 at pp. 37-39; Report 
of the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, Cmd. No. 
8932, at pp. 34-43,45 (1949-1953); 3 Stephen, History of the 
Criminal Law of England 57-58, 74-75 (1883); Packer, The 
Case for Revision of the Penal Code, 13 Stan.L.Rev. 252, 
259; Morris, The Felon's Responsibility for the Lethal Acts 
of Others, 105 U.Pa.L.Rev. 50; 66 Yale L.J. 427.)8 [12] Al-
though it is the law in this state (Pen. Code, § 189), it should 
not be extended beyond any rational function that it is de-
signed to serve. Accordingly, for a defendant to be guilty 
of murder under the felony-murder rule the act ·of killing 
must be committed by the defendant or by his accomplice 
acting in furtherance of their common design. (Common~ 
wealth v. Campbell, 89 Mass. 541 [83 Am. Dec. 705]; Butler 
v. People, 125 Ill. 641 [18 N.E. 338, 8 Am.St.Rep. 423]; 
Commonwealth v. Moore, 121 Ky. 97 [88 S.W. 1085, 2 L.R.A. 
N.S. 719, 123 .Am. St. Rep. 189, 11 Ann. Cas. 1024] ; State v .. 
Oxendine, 187 N.C. 658 [122 S.E. 568]; see also People v. 
Ferlin, 203 Cal. 587, 597 [265 P. 230].) Language in People 
v. Harrison, 176 Cal.App.2d 330 [1 Cal.Rptr. 414], incon-
sistent with this holding, is disapproved. 
[18] On his appeAl from the robbery conviction, defend-
ant contends that he did not participate in the robbery. He 
testified that on the evening of the robbery be was with Ball 
and a man named Johnson. He did not know that they 
intended to commit robbery. He was "pretty drunk" at 
the time and fell asleep in the automobile. When he awoke 
the automobile was parked near Carpenter's gasoline station, 
8The felony·murder rule has been abolished in England (English 
Homicide Act, § 1, 1957, 5 & 6 EIiz. II, c. 11), and has been converted 
to a rebuttable presumption of malice by the Model Penal Code. (Model 
Pen. Code (Tent. Draft No.9, May 8, 19(9) 1201.2.) 
/ )' 
-. 
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and Ball and Johnson were absent. He left the automobile 
to look for them. As he approached the station, Johnson 
ran from the vault. Carpenter shot just as Johnson ducked 
around a corner and dropped the moneybag. Carpenter's 
bullet hit defendant who fell wounded near the bag that 
Johnson had dropped. 
Defendant's testimony was corroborated by the testimony 
of James Johnson, an inmate of the state prison for an un-
related crime at the time of defendant's trial. Johnson testi-
fied that he was the man who ran from the vault with the 
moneybag. Carpenter controverted their testimony, how-
ever, by identifying defendant as the man who ran from the 
vault. The evidence is therefore sufficient to support defend-
ant's conviction of robbery. 
[14] Defendant contends, however, that the trial court 
on its own motion should have instructed the jury to view _ 
Carpenter's testimony with caution on the ground that it 
tended to be self-serving because ICarpenter "was relieved 
of any criminal or civil responsibility for the shootings by 
implicating [defendant] and the deceased in an attempted 
robbery." All testimony that favors a witness' real or im-
agined self-interest, however, does not require a cautionary 
instruction. The testimony of a robbery victim does not come 
from a "tainted source" as does the testimony of an accom-
plice (People v. Robinson, 43 Cal.2d 132, 141 [271 P.2d 865] ; 
-People v. Wallin, 32 Cal.2d 803, 808 [197 P.2d 734]; Code 
Civ. Proc., § 2061, subd. 4), nor is his testimony like that of 
.8 complaining witness in a sex offense, which may be moti-
-vated by malice and beyond effective contradiction because 
it relates to matters that ordinarily take place in secrecy. 
-(People v. Putnam, 20 Cal.2d 885, 891-892 [129 P.2d 367].) 
In the present case, there was no such danger of per-
jury, and defendant had a fair opportunity to controvert the 
witness' testimony. The court properly instructed the jury 
that they were the exclusive judges of the credibility of the 
witnesses and informed them that they might consider such 
matters as the relation of the witnesses to the case and their 
interest therein. Although the court could have made 
, 'such comment on the evidence and tlle testimony and 
credibility of any witness as in its opinion [was J necessary 
for the proper determination of the case ... " (Pen. Code, 
§ 1127), it was not required to give a cautionary instruction. 
The judgment is affirmed as to defendant's conviction of 
May 1965] PEOPLE 1). WASHINGTON 
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first degree robbery and . reversed as to his conviction of 
first degree murder. 
Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Peek, J., and White, J.,. concurred. 
BURKE, J.-I dissent. The unfortunate effect of the de-
cision of the majority in this case is to advise felons: 
"Henceforth in committing certain crimes, including rob-
bery, rape and burglary, you are free to arm yourselves with 
a gun and brandish it in the faces of your victims without 
fear of a murder conviction unless you or your accomplice 
pulls the trigger. If the menacing effect of your gun causes 
a victim or policeman to fire and kill an innocent person or 
.a cofelon, you are absolved of responsibility for such killing 
unless you shoot first." 
Obviously this advance judicial absolution removes one 
of the most meaningful deterrents to the commission of 
armed felonies. . 
In the present case defendant's accomplice was killed when 
the robbery victim fired after the accomplice had pointed 8. 
revolver at him. In People v. Harr2~son (1959) 176 Cal.App. 
2d 330 [1 Cal.Rptr. 414] (hearing in Supreme Court denied 
without a dissenting vote), the rationale of which the major-
ity now disapprove, the robbery victim was himself acci-
dentally killed by a shot fired by his employee after defendant 
robbers had opened fire, and the robbers were· held guilty 
of murder for the killing. The majority now attempt to dis-
tinguish Harrison on the ground that there the robbers "ini-
tiated" the gun battle; in the present case the victim fired 
the first shot. As will appear, any such purported distinction 
is an invitation to further armed crimes of violence. There 
is DO room in the law for sporting considerations and dis-
tinctions as to who fired ·first when dealing with killings 
which are caused by the actions of felons in deliberately 
arming themselves to commit any of the heinous crimes listed 
in Penal Code section 189. If a victim--or someone defend-
ing the victim-seizes an opportunity to shoot first when 
confronted by robbers with a deadly weapon (real or simu-
lated), any "gun battle" is initiated by the armed robbers. 
In such a situation application of the felony-murder rule of 
section 189 of the Penal Code supports, if not compels, the 
conclusion that the surviving robbers committed murder 
even if the lethal bullet did not come from one of their guns, 
·Retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court sitting under assign· 
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and whether it is an innocent person or an accomplice who 
dies. 
Section 187 of the Penal Code declares that "Murder is 
the unlawful[I] killing of a human being, with malice afore-
thought. " Section 188 states that "Such malice may be 
express or implied. It is express when there is manifested 
a deliberate intention unlawfully to take away ... life .... It 
is implied ... when the circumstances attending the killing 
show an abandoned and malignant heart." 
Section 189 specifies that" All murder which is perpetrated 
by ... any ... kind of wilful, deliberate, and premeditated 
killing, or which is committed in the perpetration or attempt 
to perpetrate ... robbery [or five other named felonies2 ], is 
murder of the first degree .... " 
So heinous has the Legislature considered murders in the 
perpetration of these offenses that it grouped them with 
murder by means of poison, lying in wait or by torture, and, 
fundamentally, the law in this respect has remained un-
changed for more than one hundred years. (Stats. 1850, 
p. 231; Stats. 1856, p. 219; now Pen. Code, § 189.) 
In People v. Milton (1904) 145 Cal. 169, 171-172 [78 P. 549], 
the court pointed out that a killing is unlawful which is 
"perpetrated in the performance or attempt to perform one 
of these felonies, and the malice of the abandoned and malig-
nant heart is shown from the very nature of the crime" the 
defendant is attempting to commit: Thus the killing is estab-
lished as murder under section 187, in the light of the defini-
tion of malice found in section 188, and section 189 makes 
it first degree murder. Therefore, held the court, even if the 
killing be accidental or unintentional, if committed in tIle 
attempt to perpetrate one of the felonies named in section 
189 it is first degree murder. 
This principle has been repeatedly upheld by this court 
(see People v. Raber (1914) 168 Cal. 316, 318 [143 P. 317] ; 
People v. Witt (1915) 170 Cal. 104, 107-108 [148 P. 928] ; 
People v. Denman (1918) 179 Cal. 497, 498-499 [177 P. 461] ; 
People v. Boss (1930) 210 Cal. 245, 249 [290 P. 881] ; People 
v. Valentine (1946) 28 Ca1.2d 121, 135 [169 P.2d 1] ; People 
v. Coeft,eld (1951) 37 Ca1.2d 865,868 [236 P.2d 570]), and is 
expressly recognized by the majority in the instant case with 
the declaration (ante, p. 781) that "inadvertent or acci-
II.e., not excusable (§ 195) or justifiable (§§ 196, 197). 
2I.e., arson, rape, burglary, mayllem, or allY act punishable under 
eection 288 (lewd or lascivious acts against children). 
) 
May 1965] PEOPLE 1.1. WASHINGTON 
ra C.2d '177;-44 Cal.Rptr. 442, 402 P.2d 1301 
787 
dental killings are first degree murders when committed by 
felons in the perpetration of robbery." (Italics added.) The 
majority further expressly recognize the rule (ante, pp. 781-
782) that" A defendant need not do the killing himself ... 
to be guilty of murder .... All persons aiding and abetting 
the commission of a robbery are guilty of first degree murder 
when one of them kills" in the perpetration of the robbery. 
(See People v. Boss, supra.) 
Despite these declared principles-long established and 
effective in their deterrence of crimes of violence-the ma-
jority now announce (ante, p. 781) that "When a killing is 
not committed by a robber or by his accomplice but by his 
victim, malice aforethought is not attributable to the robber, 
for the killing is not committed by him in the perpetration 
or attempt to perpetrate robbery. It is not enough that the 
killing was a risk reasonably to be foreseen .. ,. Section 189 
requires that the felon or his accomplice commit the killing, 
for if he does not, the killing is not committed to perpetrate 
the felony.... To include such killings within section 189 
would expand the meaning of the words' murder . . , which is 
committed in the perpetration." [of] robbery,.,' beyond 
common understanding." (Italics added.) 
But section 189 carries not the least suggestion of a require-
ment that the killing must take place to perpetrate the felony. 
If that requirement now be read into the section by the ma-
jority, then what becomes of the rule-which they purport 
to recognize-that an accidental and unintentional killing 
falls within the section' How can it be said that such a 
killing takes place to perpetrate a robbery' . 
Moreover, as already noted, the malice aforethought of 
the abandoned and malignant heart is shown from the very 
nature of the crime, here armed robbery, the defendant is 
attempting to commit. (People v. Milton (1904) supra, 145 
Cal. 169, 171-172.) This truism was confirmed in People v. 
Bostic (1914) 167 Cal. 754, 761 [14P. 380], wherein the 
court pointed out that the argument that to be first degree 
murder a killing during robbery must be planned as a part 
of the scheme, carries its own refutation, "for it must be 
apparent that without reference to the robbery such a murder 
would be a 'wilful, deliberate and premeditated killing,' " 
and hence, first degree murder; further, said the court, "The 
moment [defendant] entered that [train] car with a deadly 
weapon in his hand, with the purpose of committing robbery, 
the law fixed upon him the intent which would make any 
) 
. ../ 
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killing in the perpetration of the robbery or in the attempt ... 
a murder of the tirst degree. In such cases the law does not 
measure the delicate scruples of the robber with reference to 
shooting his victim." Again in PeopZe v. Coefield, supra (1951) 
37 Cal.2d 865, 868 [2] the court took note of the rule 
. "that when one enters a place with a deadly weapon for the 
purpose of committing robbery, malice is shown by the nature 
of the attempted crime." This is also the approach of the 
general felony-murder doctrine, a doctrine which (the ma-
jority confirm) ascribes malice aforethought where the kill-
ing is in the perpetration of an inherently dangerous felony. 
As expressed in People v. Ford (1964) 60 Cal.2d 772, 795 
[36 Cal.Rptr. 620, 388 P .2d 892], cited by the majority, "A 
homicide that is a direct causal result of the commission of a 
felony inherently dangerous to human lIfe (other than the six 
felonies enumerated in Pen. Code, sec. 189) constitutes at 
least second degree murder. [Citations.]" (Italics added.) 
\ A homicide which arises out of an attempt at armed robbery 
is a direct causal result of the chain of events set in motion 
by the robbers when they undertook their felony. When a 
victim tires the lethal bullet, whether or not he fires first, 
the killing is caused by the act of the felon and the felon is 
88 responsible therefor 88 when the firing is by his accomplice 
or when it is accidental or unintentional. S The majority sug-
gest (ante, p. 782), ",it is unnecessary to imply malice 
by invoking the felony-murder doctrine" where the robber 
,"initiates" a gun battle by shooting first. This suggestion by 
the majority, I respectfully submit, emphasizes the inconsist-
ency of their opinion. First they declare (ante, p. 781) that 
"When a killing is fiDt committed by a robber ... but by his 
victim, malice aforethought is not attributabZe to the robber, 
for the killing is not committed by him in ... robbery." (Ital-
ics added.) Later they state (ante, p. 782) that "Defendants 
who initiate gun battles may also be found guilty of murder 
if their victims resist and kill . . . and it is unnecessary to 
imply malice by invoking the felony-murder doctrine." (Ital-
ics added.) 
SIt should be noted that the doctrine of proximate causation has not 
been confined to civil eases. In People v. Mon1c (1961) 56 Ca1.2d 288, 
296 [14 CalRptr. 633, 363 P.2d 865J, for example, the defendant made 
threats of serious bodily harm to a person whom he had kidnaped for 
purposes of robbery, and the threats caused her to jump from an auto-
mobile and receive injuries. This court held that the doctrine of proximate 
causation was applicable, that the victim bad suffered "hodily harm" 
within the meaning of Penal Code section 209, and that the penalty of 
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But malice aforethought is an essential element of murder. 
(Pen. Code, § 187.) If it is not attributable to the robber 
when a killing is "committed by" his victim rather than by 
himself in a gun battle initiated by the robber, is the essen-
tial malice express--or is it to be implied under some doctrine 
other than the felony-murder rule' Do the majority imply 
the malice of the abandoned and malignant heart (Pen. 
Code, § 188) only if the robber shoots first, but not if he 
merely creates the foreseeable risk that "the victim will resist 
and kill" f .And this despite the fact that, as the majority 
further affirm (ante, p. 781), "the robbery might therefore 
be regarded as a proximate cause of the killing'" 
Even if, as the majority suggest (ante, p. 782), it is un-
necessary to imply malice by invoking the felony-murder 
doctrine where the robber shoots first, that doctrine can 
and should be invoked i,n a case in which, as here, a 
robber with a gun in his hand confronts a victim who can 
and does resist by firing the first shot. In such a case, the 
robber "initiated" the criminal plan, he "initiated" it by 
wilfully, maliciously and wantonly putting the victim in fear 
of his life, and he "initiated" any resultant shooting, whether 
by his gun or that of the victim. Where the victim is in a 
position to shoot first and his bullet kills, the killing should 
be viewed in law and in fact as having been "committed" 
by the robber (as it was in People v. Harrison, supra, 176 
Cal.App.2d 330), and application of the felony-murder rule 
to such circumstances is, in my view, exactly the sort of 
"rational function that it is designed to serve' '-in the 
-phrasing of the majority (ante, p. 783). 
Extreme examples may be imagined in which the applica-
tion of a rule of criminal liability would appear manifestly 
unjust. However, when this court and others have been faced 
with such aD example exceptions have been made to avoid 
an unconscionable result. To reject invocation of the felony-
murder rule here, as do the majority (ante, pp. 782-783), 
because of possible harshness in its application in other cir-
cumstances, for example, to fleeing robbers who are not armed, 
dilutes the enforcement of criminal responsibility. The case 
anticipated and the injustice sought to be protected against 
by the majority are not before us, and can best be dealt with 
when and if encountered. It may be observed, however, that 
robbers are not compelled to flee and thus to be shot at en-
dangering themselves and others. They need only surrender, 
as many have done, to avoid death, to themselves or others, 
-J 
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and the awesome penalties which attach under the felonY-1 
murder la .-; 
I agree with the majority (ante, p. 781) that one pur-
pose of the felony-murder rule is to deter felons from killing 
negligently or accidentally. However, another equally cogent 
purpose is to deter them from undertaking inherently dan-
gerous felonies in which, as the majority state (an-te, p. 
781), a "killing was a risk reasonably to be foreseen. 
. .. In every robbery there is a possibility that the victim will 
resist and kill." As declared in People v. Chavez (1951) 87 
Ca1.2d 656, 669 [284 P.2d 682], "The statute [Pen. Code, 
§ 189] was adopted for the protection of the community and 
its residents, not for the benefit of the lawbreaker." Wby a· 
felon who has undertaken an armed robbery, which this court 
now expressly notifies him carries a "risk" and "a possi-
bility that the victim will resist and kill," and which "might 
therefore be regarded as a proximate cause of the killing" 
should nevertheless be absolved because, fortuitously, the vic-
tim can and does shoot first and the lethal bullet comes from 
the victim's gun rather than from his own, will be beyond 
the comprehension of the. average law-abiding citizen, to say 
nothing of that of victims of armed robbery. Nor is such a 
view compatible with the felony-murder doctrine. 
But, say the majority, "The robber has little control over 
such a killing once the robbery is undertaken," and "To im-
pose an additional penalty for the killing would discriminate 
between robbers, not on the basis of any difference in their 
own conduct, but solely on the basis of the response by others 
that the robber's conduct happened to induce." (An-te, 
p. 781). A robber has n.o control over a bullet sent on its 
way after he pulls the trigger. Certainly his inability to 
recall it before it kills does not cloak him with innocence 
of the homicide. The truth is, of course, that the robber may 
exercise various "controls over" a possible killing from his 
victim's bullet" once the robbery is undertaken. " The robber 
can drop his own weapon, he can refrain from using it, he can 
surrender. Other conduct can be suggested which would 
tend to reassure the victim and dissuade him from firing his 
own gun. Moreover, the response by one victim will lead to 
capture of the robbers, while that of another victim will permit 
their escape. Is the captured felon to be excused from re-
sponsibility for his crime, ill order not to "discriminate be-
tween robbers ... solely on the basis of the response by others 
that the robber's conduct happened to induce"! 
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The robber's conduct which forms the basis of his criminal 
responsibility is the undertaking of the armed felony, in 
which a "killing was a risk reasonably to be foreseen" in-
cluding the "possibility that the victim will resist and kill." 
If that risk becomes reality and a killing occurs, the guilt 
for it is that of the felon. And when done, it is murder 
in the first degree-calling for death or life imprisonment. 
And to say that the knowledge that this awesome, sobering, 
terrifying responsibility of one contemplating the use of a 
deadly weapon in the perpetration of one of the listed offenses 
is not the strongest possible deterrent to the commission of 
such offenses belies what is being demonstrated day after 
day in the criminal departments of our trial courts. 
I would hold, in accord with the rationale of People v. Har-
rison, supra (1959) 176 Cal.App.2d 330, that the killing is 
that of the felon whether or not the lethal bullet comes from 
his gun or that of his accomplice and whether or not one of 
them shoots first, and would affirm the judgment of convic-
tion of murder in the instant case. 
McComb, J., concurred. 
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied June 23, 
1965. Mosk, J., did not participate therein. McComb J., and 
Burke, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be 
granted. . 
